OMB Review of Environmental Regulations: Limitations on the Courts and Congress by Steinberg, Robert E
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Robert E. Steinberg*
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) review of environmen-
tal regulations has come under increased scrutiny as environmental
groups have charged OMB with using the regulatory review process
to block and weaken environmental regulations. Arguing that OMB
has acted in excess of its authority and in defiance of statutory direc-
tives, environmental groups have brought several lawsuits and pro-
moted legislation designed to limit OMB involvement in the
regulatory process. The groups claim that OMB's objective is sim-
ply to reduce industry costs and that OMB review has prevented the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) from effectively carrying
out its statutory mandate to protect the environment.
Regardless of one's views on the wisdom of OMB action, these
efforts to sharply curtail OMB's powers of regulatory review are ill-
advised. They intrude on executive branch powers and seek relief
that courts should not and arguably cannot grant. Though environ-
mental groups may dislike the policies of the Reagan Administra-
tion, their attempts to persuade the courts to interfere with OMB
review of regulations should be rejected. The relief that environ-
mental groups are seeking would prevent the various offices and
agencies within the executive branch from consulting with each
other, severely restrict such consultations, or force disclosure of
agency deliberations that should be privileged. Any such measures
will necessarily impair executive branch decisionmaking and make it
difficult for the President to ensure that agency regulations are con-
sistent with Administration policy, thereby seriously undercutting
Presidential authority. In addition, jurisdictional and constitutional
limitations on intrusion into executive branch prerogatives must
lead the courts and Congress to view attempts to use the judicial
system to restrict OMB review of regulatory action with suspicion.
* Attorney, Porter, Wright, Morris & Arthur, Washington, DC; Special Litigation
Counsel at the United States Department ofJustice, 1984-86; Special Assistant to Attor-
ney General William French Smith, 1983-84;J.D., Washington University School of Law,
1979. The author was lead counsel for the government in Environmental Defense Fund v.
Thomas, the first major court decision on OMB's role in the review of environmental
regulations. The views expressed in this article, however, are solely those of the author.
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I. OMB's Role In Reviewing Environmental Regulations
OMB has long taken an active role in reviewing environmental
and other regulations to ensure compliance with Administration
policies.' Beginning with the Nixon Administration's "Quality of
Life Review", 2 and extending through the Ford 3 and Carter4 Ad-
ministrations, Presidents have sought to expand and centralize re-
view of federal regulation. 5
1. The debate over the constitutional and statutory limits on OMB review of agency
regulations has been going on for some time now, for the most part in law journals. See,
e.g., Bruff, Presidential Power and Administrative Rulemaking, 88 YALE L.J. 451 (1979); Cutler
& Johnson, Regulation and the Political Process, 84 YALE LJ. 1395 (1975); Zamir, Administra-
tive Control of Administrative Action: The Exceptions, 51 N.Y.U. L. REV. 587 (1976). After the
issuance of Executive Order 12,291, see infra note 6 and accompanying text, more arti-
cles followed. See, e.g., Bernstein, The Presidential Role in Administrative Rulemaking: Improv-
ing Policy Directives: One Votefor Not Tying the President's Hands, 56 TUL. L. REV. 818 (1982);
Davis, Presidential Control of Rulemaking, 56 TUL. L. REV. 849 (1982); Olson, The Quiet Shift
of Power: Office of Management and Budget Supervision of Environmental Protection Agency
Rulemaking under Executive Order 12,291, 4 VA.J. NAT. RES. L. 1 (1984); Rosenberg, Beyond
the Limits of Executive Power: Presidential Control of Agency Rulemaking under Executive Order
12,291, 80 MICH. L. REV. 193 (1981); Shane, Presidential Regulatory Oversight and the Sepa-
ration of Powers: The Constitutionality of Executive Order 12,291, 23 ARIZ. L. REV. 1235
(1981); Morrison, OMB Interference with Agency Rulemaking: The Wrong Way to Write a Regu-
lation, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1059 (1986); DeMuth & Ginsburg, White House Review of Agency
Rulemaking, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1075 (1986).
2. President Nixon initiated "Quality of Life Review," an OMB oversight procedure
aimed at all health and safety regulations but focusing almost exclusively on EPA regula-
tions. This controversial measure required that drafts of all EPA- proposed regulations
be circulated among interested (and often hostile) agencies, with time allowed for com-
ment; questions would be resolved at staff meetings. See G. Schultz, Memorandum for
the Heads of Departments and Agencies from OMB Director (Oct. 5, 1971), quoted in
Federal Regulation and Regulatory Reform: Report by the Subcomm. on Oversight and
Investigations of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess. 121-22 (1976); Bruff, supra note 1, at 464-65.
Some commentators regard the Johnson Administration as the first to engage in regu-
latory review. Olson, supra note 1, at 9. In that Administration, OMB's predecessor, the
Bureau of the Budget, made independent attempts to oversee important agency regula-
tions. For a more detailed discussion of the history of presidential review of regulations,
see DeMuth & Ginsburg, supra note 1, at 1075-80.
3. President Ford was the first to issue an executive order to control OMB review of
agency regulations. Exec. Order No. 11,821, 3 C.F.R. 926 (1974), reprinted in 12 U.S.C.
§ 1904, at 592 (1976), modified by Exec. Order No. 11,949, 3 C.F.R. 161 (1977). Exec.
Order No. 11,281 required all executive branch agencies to prepare economic impact
statements of the inflationary results of proposed rulemaking.
4. President Carter issued an executive order establishing a Regulatory Analysis and
Review Group, which reviewed and published critiques of a few major rules. Exec. Or-
der No. 12,044, 3 C.F.R. 152 (1978), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 553, at 70 (1976 & Supp. II
1978). The Carter Executive Order also established a compilation of upcoming rules,
known as a "Regulatory Calendar."
5. Regulatory review prior to the Reagan Administration did not include review of
all regulations, and rulemaking agencies were free to ignore the comments of the re-
viewing authorities. General Accounting Office, Improved Quality, Adequate Resources, and
Consistent Oversight Needed if Regulatory Analysis is to Help Control Costs of Regulations 45
(1982).
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President Reagan, however, has taken the strongest measures yet
to ensure appropriate supervision of the regulatory process, giving
OMB unprecedented power in its oversight of agency regulations.
On February 17, 1982, President Reagan issued Executive Order
12,291, requiring executive agencies to submit all proposed and fi-
nal rulemaking actions to OMB for review prior to publication and
prohibiting issuance of the rule or proposal until a response has
been made to OMB's comments. 6 On January 4, 1985, the Presi-
dent issued Executive Order 12,498, requiring agencies to submit
annually to OMB for review a "draft regulatory program" that de-
scribes all "significant regulatory actions" the agency intends to un-
dertake during the next year. 7 Through OMB review of specific
rules and the regulatory agendas, President Reagan has sought to
reduce regulatory burdens, provide for presidential oversight of the
administrative process, and ensure well-reasoned regulations. 8
The need for oversight and coordination of the regulatory pro-
cess has become more important with the growth of the federal gov-
ernment. It is no longer appropriate for an agency to pursue its
own narrow regulatory goals single-mindedly, without taking into
account competing social and economic policies and goals. If no
individual or entity is permitted to unify the multitude of govern-
ment policy objectives, agencies may adopt conflicting positions on
particular problems, and regulatory goals may conflict hopelessly
until none of them are fulfilled. 9 For this reason, it is imperative
that the President be permitted to supervise agency discretion
through OMB and that agency heads be allowed to work together
rather than in isolation from one another.
A. Executive Order 12,291
Executive Order 12,291 is designed to improve the regulatory
process by requiring executive branch agencies to be more fully
aware of the consequences of and alternatives to their proposed ac-
tions.' 0 It seeks to achieve this goal in two ways. First, it requires
6. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1981), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601, at 431
(1982) [hereinafter cited as E.O. 12,291].
7. Exec. Order No. 12,498, 3 C.F.R. 323 (1986), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601, at 40
(Supp. III 1985) [hereinafter cited as E.O. 12,498].
8. The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), created by the
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980 (44 U.S.C. §§ 3501-20 (1982)) to implement that stat-
ute's paperwork review requirements, has become a focal point for regulatory review.
See generally Olson, supra note 1.
9. Bernstein, supra note 1, at 827.
10. The Executive Order, by its terms, does not apply to so-called independent
agencies (including, for instance, the General Accounting Office, the Securities and Ex-
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that agencies, to the extent permitted by their enabling legislation,
promulgate regulations that conform to the requirements set forth
in the Order. The most important of these requirements are 1) that
the potential benefits of the regulatory action outweigh the potential
costs and 2) that the alternative with the "least net cost to society"
be chosen." 1
The second of these key requirements involves preparation of
Regulatory Impact Analyses (RIAs) for all major rules, analyzing
them in light of the requirements of E.O. 12,291.12 Agencies must
send copies of their RIAs, along with all notices of proposed
rulemaking and all final rules, to the Director of OMB prior to pro-
mulgation. The Director is given authority to review these docu-
ments, consult with agencies on preliminary analyses and notices of
proposed rulemaking, and submit views on final analyses and final
rules. Agencies must consult with OMB if OMB so requests, and
change Commission, the National Labor Relations Board, or the Federal Trade Com-
mission). E.O. 12,291, supra note 6, at § 1(d), excluding agencies specified in 44 U.S.C.
§ 3502 (1976). Vice President Bush, however, in his capacity as head of the Presidential
Task Force on Regulatory Relief, formally requested that seventeen independent agen-
cies comply voluntarily with the Order. See Letter from Vice President Bush to in-
dependent agencies (Mar. 25, 1981), reprinted in Role of OMB in Regulation: Hearings of the
Oversight and Investigations Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 97th Cong.,
1st Sess. 177-78 (1981).
11. E.O. 12,291 requires executive branch agencies to promulgate regulations in ac-
cordance with the following requirements:
(a) Administrative decisions shall be based on adequate information concerning
the need for and consequences of proposed government action;
(b) Regulatory action shall not be undertaken unless the potential benefits to soci-
ety for the regulation outweigh the potential costs to society;
(c) Regulatory objectives shall be chosen to maximize the net benefits to society;
(d) Among alternative approaches to any given regulatory objective, the alterna-
tive involving the least net cost to society shall be chosen; and
(e) Agencies shall set regulatory priorities with the aim of maximizing the aggre-
gate net benefits to society, taking into account the condition of the particular in-
dustries affected by regulations, the condition of the national economy, and other
regulatory actions contemplated for the future.
E.O. 12,291, supra note 6, at § 2. The two most important requirements referred to in
the text are (b) and (d).
12. A major rule is defined as a rule with an annual effect on the economy of $100
million or more, a rule which is expected to have certain adverse economic effects, or
any rule OMB chooses to designate as "major." E.O. 12,291, supra note 6, at 88 l(b),
3(b).
What information should be included in the RIAs is clearly specified. For example,
§ 3(d)(4) of E.O. 12,291 requires agencies to provide "[a] description of alternative ap-
proaches that could substantially achieve the same regulatory goal at a lower cost, to-
gether with an analysis of this potential benefit and costs and a brief explanation of the
legal reasons why such alternatives, if proposed, could not be adopted .... "
Section 3(d) also provides that the RIA must contain a description of potential bene-
fits of the rule and who would be likely to receive these benefits, potential costs of the
rule and who would be likely to bear these costs, and a determination of the potential
net benefits.
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must respond to the Director's views. They must also defer
rulemaking both during OMB's review and until they have re-
sponded to any views expressed by the Director.
In issuing E.O. 12,291, the President did not interfere with agen-
cies' legal responsibilities. The President has only directed agencies
to respond to OMB's views, not to conform to them. OMB has ab-
solutely no authority under the Order to require conformance. In
addition, the Order itself provides that its procedures do not apply
to the extent that they conflict with a statutory or judicial deadline
for rulemaking.' 3 Moreover, an agency head can at his or her dis-
cretion promulgate a regulation without subjecting it to OMB re-
view, and the regulation will still have binding effect. The
consequences to an agency head of not following the directives of
E.O. 12,291 are not legal but political, and include possible removal
by the President. 14
The limitations in the E.O., while safeguarding legislative and
agency authority, do not make OMB's role in regulatory review inef-
fectual. OMB carries out a very important function with respect to
agency rulemaking by simply pointing out to agencies any inconsis-
tencies between their provisional rules and the President's policies.
In doing this, OMB causes agencies to focus more precisely on im-
portant issues, and provides them with the opportunity to recon-
13. Id. at § 8(a)(2). Section 3(c)(3) of E.O. 12,291 provides, interalia, that "[flor all
rules other than major rules, agencies shall submit to the Director [of OMB], at least 10
days prior to publication, every notice of proposed rulemaking and final rule." How-
ever, § 8(a)(2) of the E.O. provides that the Order shall not apply to
[a]ny regulation for which consideration or reconsideration under the terms of this
Order would conflict with deadlines imposed by statute or by judicial order, pro-
vided that . . . the agency, in consultation with the Director, shall adhere to the
requirements of this Order to the extent permitted by statutory or judicial
deadlines.
On the other hand, where a statutory or judicial deadline has passed, OMB review under
the Executive Order may still occur "to the extent permitted by law." E.O. 12,291, supra
note 6, at § 2.
14. The President's removal power is not found in the text of the Constitution, but
implicit authority for this power has been found in the so-called Removal Cases. The first
of these was Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926). It addressed the power of the
President to dismiss federal employees, holding that the Congress could not constitu-
tionally restrict the power of the President to fire a postmaster, an executive officer ap-
pointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. Later, in
Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935), the President was held to
lack power to remove an FTC Commissioner before his term expired because Congress
clearly intended the FTC to be an independent agency. In Wiener v. United States, 357
U.S. 349 (1958), the Court reiterated the bright-line functional test of "purely execu-
tive" versus quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative agencies. In that case, the Court found
that the President lacked power to remove a member of the War Claims Commission.
See generally Bruff, supra note 1, at 475-83.
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sider their courses before those courses come into conflict with
broader public goals.
B. Executive Order 12,498
At the beginning of his second term, President Reagan issued an-
other executive order. This one, Executive Order 12,498, was
designed to improve management of the government's regulatory
operations and to ensure that policy options are not narrowed pre-
maturely and that each significant regulatory proposal will be con-
sidered in relation to other such proposals. 15 E.O. 12,498 requires
agency heads to prepare and to submit to OMB a regulatory over-
view statement and a description of any significant regulatory ac-
tions they are planning or conducting.' 6 0MB then reviews each
draft regulatory program for consistency with the Administration's
regulatory policies and priorities and with the draft regulatory pro-
grams submitted by other agencies. Issues raised but not resolved
by OMB and the agency are referred to an appropriate forum and,
when necessary, to the President.' 7 Following this review, the
agency statements of regulatory policies and significant regulatory
actions are compiled and published in the Administration's Regula-
tory Program. This process complements E.O. 12,291 review by
providing agency heads and the President with a better opportunity
to decide whether a regulatory activity is worth initiating before
agency resources are committed to it.
Like 12,291, E.O. 12,498 grants OMB authority to carry out its
provisions only to the extent permitted by law. It also exempts reg-
ulations that are subject to statutory or judicial deadlines from its
prohibition on rulemaking actions that have not been approved by
OMB and incorporated into the Regulatory Program.' 8
II. Challenges to OMB Review
Environmental groups have charged in the courts and in Con-
gress that OMB has acted in excess of its authority under E.O.s
15. E.O. 12,498, supra note 7, at Preamble and §§ 1, 3.
16. Id. at § 3(c). Again, "significant" actions are economically defined.
17. The most appropriate forum for such disputes would be the Cabinet Council for
Natural Resources and the Environment. This council was formed, together with other
cabinet councils, at the beginning of the Reagan Administration, to set Administration
policy and resolve interagency disputes. The Cabinet Councils consist of six to eight
Cabinet members with expertise in a particular area, who meet on a regular basis both
with and without the President.
18. E.O. 12,498, supra note 7, at § 1(d).
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12,291 and 12,498.19 Noting that these orders allow OMB to play
only an advisory role, these groups argue that OMB has used the
regulatory review process to block and delay regulatory actions re-
quired by Congress, often in defiance of statutory deadlines, and to
displace agency decisionmaking by dictating substantive changes in
regulations.
A. Challenges in the Courts
1. OMB Involvement in Rulemaking
In Environmental Defense Fund v. Thomas,20 the Environmental De-
fense Fund (EDF) attempted to show that OMB had prevented EPA
from publishing proposed standards for underground hazardous
waste storage tanks after the statutory deadline for issuance of these
standards had passed. EPA was required by the Resource Conserva-
tion and Recovery Act (RCRA) 2' to promulgate these standards by
March 1, 1985, but had not submitted a notice of proposed rulemak-
ing to OMB for review under E.O. 12,291 until that date. EDF
claimed that even though the statutory deadline had already ex-
pired, OMB waited six weeks before giving EPA any formal com-
ments on the proposed regulations. According to EDF, OMB was
deliberately delaying clearance to the proposed regulation until
EPA agreed to make significant changes in it; EDF also claimed that
only after it filed suit against EPA and OMB on May 30, 1985 did
OMB allow EPA to publish the proposed standards. 22
EDF charged that this "blocking tactic" was not an isolated in-
stance of such action by OMB, and that OMB completely ignored
the procedures established by E.O. 12,291 to prevent OMB review
from conflicting with statutory deadlines for many other regula-
tions. The substance of EDF's charges was summarized in the or-
ganization's testimony before Congress:
OMB's current practice is to require its prepublication approval for all
EPA regulations, regardless of statutory or judicial deadlines. In re-
sponse to a discovery request in EDF's litigation, EPA identified a par-
tial list of 169 proposed or final EPA regulations subject to statutory
or judicial deadlines which EPA had been required to submit to OMB
19. See Testimony of the Environmental Defense Fund before the Subcomm. on In-
tergovernmental Relations of the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, The Role of
OMB in Regulatory Review (Jan. 28, 1986) [hereinafter referred to as EDF Testimony].
For litigation regarding OMB's role in environmental rulemaking, see Environmental
Defense Fund v. Thomas, 627 F. Supp. 566 (D.D.C. 1986); Public Health Research
Group v. Rowland, Nos. 84-1252, 84-1392, 85-1014 (D.C. Cir. argued Jan. 22, 1986).
20. EDF v. Thomas, 627 F. Supp. 566 (D.D.C. 1986).
21. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901, 6924(w).
22. EDF Testimony, supra note 19, at 10-11.
410
Vol. 4:404, 1986
OMB Review of Rulemaking
for pre-publication review under E.O. 12,291 .... On eighty-six occa-
sions, OMB extended its review beyond the time periods outlined in
the executive order despite the deadlines. In many cases OMB review
extended EPA's promulgation of the regulations beyond the date of
the deadline either because the regulations were submitted to OMB
after the deadline had expired or because OMB extended its review
beyond the deadline or vetoed the regulations prior to, or after, the
deadline. 23
EDF similarly accused OMB of delaying eleven new source perform-
ance standards required by the Clean Air Act.24 EPA had submitted
these standards to OMB for review well before the statutory dead-
line had expired, yet OMB had not only extended its review beyond
the statutory deadline but completed this review by vetoing the reg-
ulation and sending it back to EPA.
In defending itself against these charges, OMB maintained that it
reviewed regulations efficiently and did not routinely delay the pro-
mulgation of regulations which were subject to statutory deadlines.
The OMB official in charge of reviewing regulations said that:
Our average review time of sixteen days for all regulations, or in EPA's
case twenty days, is usually only a small part of the overall rulemaking
time, often measured in years. Furthermore, our review time usually is
not "dead" time for EPA. During our review, work on the draft at EPA
does not stop. The Agency reviews and clearance continue, and the
rulemaking record, supporting analysis, and other documents are put
in order for publication. 25
OMB admitted that it had engaged in E.O. 12,291 review after
statutory or judicial deadlines had passed, but argued that such re-
view was both legal and consistent with the Order. E.O. 12,291
makes it quite clear that the fact that a statutory deadline has been
missed does not per se constitute a ground for the agency not to
23. Id. at 11.
24. Id.
25. The OMB official cited here is Robert P. Bedell, head of the Information and
Regulatory Management Division of OMB's Office of Information and Regulatory Af-
fairs (OIRA). According to Bedell, between March of 1981 and September of 1985, his
office reviewed approximately 11,716 draft regulations in an average of twenty-eight
days; roughly 81 percent of all rules were reviewed in ten days and 91 percent within
thirty days. During that same time period, OIRA reviewed approximately 1,872 draft
rules from EPA; approximately 72.6 percent of all these rules were reviewed in ten days
or less and 86.3 percent in thirty days. These figures come from the affidavit Bedell
submitted to the United States District Court with Defendant's Supplemental Motion for
Summary Judgment on Dec. 12, 1985 [hereinafter referred to as Bedell Affidavit]. See
also DeMuth & Ginsburg, supra note 1, who add that "a regulation that remains under
review for many months is not languishing at the bottom of someone's in-box. If the
rule remains under review for such a time, it is typically because OMB has asked for
additional information necessary to solve the cost-benefit issues and is waiting for the
agency to supply such information." Id. at 1088.
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comply with the terms of the Order.2 6 Otherwise, agencies would
be able to circumvent the President's directive simply by not send-
ing their regulations to OMB until after a statutory deadline has
passed.
When an agency subject to E.O. 12,291 has missed a statutory or
judicial deadline, it is common practice for that agency to work out
with OMB what review procedures could apply. The requirements
for regulatory analysis may even be adjusted in order to expedite
promulgation of the regulation, unless it would be impracticable for
the agency to follow the procedures of the Order with respect to the
regulation in question. As OMB agreed, "[i]n some cases OMB re-
view is 'impracticable' altogether and agencies can, and have, pub-
lished a proposed or final rule without submitting the draft for OMB
review or without completing the analyses the Order calls for." 27 In
addition, in most cases involving statutory deadlines the two respon-
sibilities-the deadline and the E.O. 12,291 procedures-are ac-
commodated through the consultation process between OMB and
the agency. 28 This accommodation is achieved, for example, by
EPA officials initiating briefings for OMB well in advance of the
rulemaking decision, or submitting draft rules to OMB before the
senior staff and Administrator of EPA have completed their review
of the rule.29
While EDF and others dispute OMB's claims about its review pro-
cedure, they have yet to marshal any evidence clearly showing that
OMB has abused the regulatory review process by acting unilater-
ally to preclude agency heads from meeting statutory mandates.
Additionally, while it is true that OMB has engaged in regulatory
review after statutory and judicial deadlines have passed, such re-
view is legally permissible. E.O. 12,291's requirement that agencies
allow OMB to engage in regulatory review under its provisions,
even in cases where statutory or judicial deadlines have been
missed, is fully consistent with judicial precedent. Courts have long
recognized that statutory deadlines may be impossible for an agency
acting in good faith to meet and have extended the time for compli-
26. See supra, note 13.
27. Bedell Affidavit at 12.
28. Id.
29. Bedell stated that OMB had on many occasions met with EPA officials "well in
advance of the statutory deadline to plan the scheduling and allocations of resources
necessary for expeditious completion involving review of what are too often lengthy and
complicated rules." Id. at 12.
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ance with the congressionally-mandated time limits.30 If compliance
with the procedures of the Order is not practicable, then the proce-
dures of the Order do not apply to the extent of the impracticability.
But where a statutory deadline has been missed, OMB review is fully
legal as long as such review is reasonable and is not undertaken uni-
laterally by OMB. As noted in EDF v. Thomas, EPA may not delay
promulgation of a rule solely on account of withheld approval by
OMB.3 ' Accordingly, OMB can engage in E.O. 12,291 review after
a statutory deadline has passed, as long as the Administrator of EPA
concurs in the need for OMB review. Environmental groups have
not as yet shown that OMB has violated this standard.
Nor is there any compelling evidence that OMB has dictated sub-
stantive changes in regulations, displacing agency decisionmaking.
Obviously, such proof would be extremely difficult to obtain in view
of the fact that an agency head must sign the pertinent regulations
before their publication, noting his or her approval. Only if a liti-
gant could show that the agency head had fraudulently approved
regulations, signing regulations dictated by OMB even though he or
she did not agree with them, could a plausible charge of displaced
agency decisionmaking be made.
2. Difficulties Encountered in Challenging OMB Review
a. Standing
Litigants seeking to prove that OMB has acted illegally in the reg-
ulatory review process face serious difficulties with respect to estab-
lishing standing to sue. This is mainly because of the near
impossibility of proving an actual or threatened injury from the al-
legedly illegal actions of OMB.3 2 Because EPA is the decisionmaker
both under its enabling statute and under E.O. 12,291, OMB can
not be considered the source of whatever injury is alleged by plain-
tiffs. In addition, to the extent that OMB review would conflict with
a statutory or judicially imposed deadline, an agency head does have
the discretion not to submit for OMB review the proposed rulemak-
30. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 14 ELR 20,817, 20,818
(D.D.C. 1984), citing Alabama Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323, 359 (D.C. Cir. 1980);
Natural Resources Defense Council v. Train, 510 F.2d 692, 712-13 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
31. EDF v. Thomas, 627 F. Supp. 566, 571 (D.D.C. 1986).
32. Article III of the Constitution restricts the power of the federal judiciary to any
case or controversy"; this requires that the plaintiff show " 'that he personally has suf-
fered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the putatively illegal conduct of the
defendant,' ... and that the injury 'fairly can be traced to the challenged action' and 'is
likely to be redressed by a favorable decision.' " Valley Forge Christian College v.
Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1981)
quoting Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org. 426 U.S. 26, 38, 41 (1976).
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ing and final rule. Accordingly, any injury alleged by plaintiffs
would be caused by actions of EPA, not by actions of OMB.
Moreover, even if litigants could meet the constitutionally im-
posed requirements for standing, they might still be prevented from
prosecuting their suit if certain prudential considerations dictate
that the court stay its hand.33 Of particular concern in lawsuits
charging OMB with illegal conduct in regulatory review are consid-
erations of separation of powers. When the exercise of judicial
power affects the relationship between the co-equal arms of the na-
tional government, there are compelling reasons to regard the
standing concept as informed by separation of powers considera-
tions.34 As noted by Justice Powell in his concurring opinion in
United States v. Richardson, and quoted with approval by Justice Rehn-
quist in Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of
Church and State, Inc.:
[R]epeated and essentially head-on confrontations between the life-
tenured branch and the representative branches of government will
not, in the long run, be beneficial to either. The public confidence
essential to the former and the vitality critical to the latter may well
erode if we do not exercise self-restraint in the utilization of our power
to negative the actions of other branches. We should be ever mindful
of the contradictions that would arise if a democracy were to permit
general oversight of the elected branches of government by the non-
representative, and in large measure insulated, judicial branch.35
The remedy a litigant would request in a case against OMB, an
injunction limiting OMB's participation in review of the regulation,
33. See Tax Analysts and Advocates v. Blumenthal, 566 F.2d 130, 137 n.37 (D.C. Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1977) ("The Supreme Court has announced these
prudential limitations in its supervisory capacity over the federal judiciary and . . . we
believe there is a nondiscretionary duty to apply the limitations.")
34. See, e.g., Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of
Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1981). In a series of cases involving the
standing of a member of Congress to bring a lawsuit in federal court, however, panels of
the District of Columbia Circuit have concluded that separation of powers concerns have
no bearing on standing analysis. Moore v. House of Representatives, 733 F.2d 946
(D.C. Cir. 1984); VanderJagt v. O'Neill, 699 F.2d 1166 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 823 (1983); Riegle v. Federal Open Market Comm. 656 F.2d 873 (D.C. Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1082 (1981). In some of these cases, well-reasoned objections to
this trend have been made. Moore, 733 F.2d at 956 (Scalia, J., concurring); Vanderjagt,
699 F.2d at 1177 (Bork, J., concurring). Members of the court have argued that separa-
tion of powers considerations are properly addressed as part of the standing require-
ment. In Crockett v. Reagan, 720 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1983), Judge Bork, in a
concurring opinion, concluded that he was not bound by the panel decisions in Riegle
and VanderJagi because prior to those cases the circuit had worked out a "fairly definite
formula to relate separation-of-power concerns to the problem of legislator standing"
and, under the established practice of the circuit, a panel could not change the law of
legislative standing without submitting the issue to the full court. Id. at 1357.
35. 454 U.S. at 474, quoting United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 188 (1974).
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would require an extraordinary intrusion into the internal workings
of a coordinate branch of the federal government. Granting such
relief would very likely result in frequent, repeated and essentially
head-on confrontations between the executive and the federal
courts, exactly the type of confrontation which the Supreme Court
has warned will damage the legitimacy of court decisions and risk
the vitality of our democratic government. Accordingly, there are
compelling reasons, based on considerations of separation of power
and of the proper role of the courts in relation to the political
branches of government, to deny would-be litigants standing to sue
OMB for its participation in the rulemaking process.
b. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
In those environmental statutes in which Congress has set agency
deadlines, the citizens' suit provision gives a court authority to issue
orders directed to the Administrator of EPA.3 6 Under these stat-
utes, courts are not given any jurisdiction over OMB. Moreover, the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA)3 7 would not provide a basis of
jurisdiction over OMB's review of an agency regulation because
such review would not constitute final agency action. Under Section
704 of the APA only final agency action for which there is no other
adequate remedy is subject to judicial review, 38 and OMB clearly
does not take any final action in merely reviewing a proposed rule.
The agency head retains responsibility and authority for the sub-
stantive rulemaking. The fact that changes occur in the draft rule
after it is submitted to OMB for review, and after the advice of and
consultation with OMB, does not mean that the agency authority
36. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982) (Water Pollution Control Act); 42 U.S.C.
§§ 6901-6999 (1982) (Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976); 42 U.S.C.
§§ 7401-7642 (1982) (Clean Air Act). See generally Fadil, Citizen Suits Against Polluters:
Picking up the Pace, 9 HARV. ENvrL. L. REV. 23 (1985).
37. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-706 (1982).
38. 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1982). The Supreme Court has ruled that an agency action is
final if it imposes an obligation, denies a right, or fixes some legal relationship as a
consummation of the administrative process. Chicago & Southern Airlines, Inc. v. Wa-
terman Steamship Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 112-13 (1948); see also Nevada Airlines v. Bond,
622 F.2d 1017, 1020 n.5 (9th Cir. 1980). In applying this standard to determine finality,
the Court has looked to a number of factors, including 1) was the alleged action a defini-
tive "statement of position" or only a threshold determination that further inquiry is
warranted; 2) did the alleged action have the "status of law" or legal force compared to
that of a regulation; and 3) would judicial review interfere with the proper function of
the agency and burden the courts in those cases where the legal challenge is intended to
"speed enforcement of a regulatory scheme." See, e.g., FTC v. Standard Oil of Califor-
nia, 449 U.S. 232, 239-40 (1980); Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967);
Air California v. United States Dep't of Transportation, 654 F.2d 616, 620-22 (9th Cir.
1981). See also Puget Sound Traffic Ass'n v. Civil Aeronautics Board, 536 F.2d 437, 439-
40 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
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has been displaced. Such OMB review is in fact a prime illustration
of non-final action, consisting only of providing advice and analysis
in a matter on which no final decision has yet been made by the
rulemaking agency.
Courts have long held that such action is not reviewable under the
APA.3 9 Furthermore, OMB review cannot be considered final
agency action for purposes of the APA judicial review provision be-
cause it does not have the "status of law." OMB has no authority
under the Executive Order to require agencies to conform to its
view, nor would an agency regulation lack binding legal effect if the
agency did not submit a regulation for review under the Executive
Order.
Even if the APA allowed review of a nonfinal agency action such
as OMB review of regulations, a federal court would still not have
jurisdiction to review OMB's actions because the citizen suit provi-
sions in environmental statutes typically confer jurisdiction on fed-
eral courts only to issue orders directed to the Administrator of
EPA.40 Thus, under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
and other environmental statutes that give a district court jurisdic-
tion only to order the Administrator of EPA to perform nondiscre-
tionary acts, a district court has no authority to issue any order
against OMB and is even limited in any order against EPA. In most
instances, a court may only set a date by which EPA is to issue a final
decision. It has no authority to control discretionary deliberations
in which the agency may engage prior to that date.
Although litigants would have difficulty establishing jurisdiction
for a lawsuit against OMB, they might succeed in establishing juris-
diction over the agency charged with the statutory responsibility of
issuing a regulation. If so, they might then be able to obtain a court
39. See, e.g., Puget Sound Traffic Ass'n v. Civil Aeronautics Board, 536 F.2d 437
(D.C. Cir. 1976); Eastern Air Lines v. Civil Aeronautics Board, 243 F.2d 607 (D.C. Cir.
1957).
40. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1369 (Water Pollution Control Act); 42 U.S.C. § 6976 (Re-
source Conservation and Recovery Act). The RCRA citizen suit provision, which served
as the basis for jurisdiction in EDF v. Thomas, is a prime example of a statute which does
not confer jurisdiction over OMB on federal courts. The relevant portion of the RCRA
provision reads as follows:
Any person may commence a civil action on his own behalf against the Administra-
tor where there is alleged a failure of the Administrator to perform any act or duty
under this chapter which is not discretionary with the Administrator. Any action
brought under ... this subsection may be brought in the district court for the dis-
trict in which the alleged violation occurred or in the District Court of the District of
Columbia. The district court shall have jurisdiction, without regard to the amount
in controversy or the citizenship of the parties, to enforce such regulation or order,
or to order the Administrator to perform such act or duty as the case may be.
42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(2) (1982).
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order against EPA which 'implicated' OMB. In EDF v. Thomas,
Judge Flannery reasoned that because he had the power to order
the Administrator of EPA to perform his nondiscretionary duty and
because he found that EPA was not fulfilling its duty under some
misapprehension that OMB was entitled to delay promulgation of
regulations, he could issue declaratory relief setting forth the pa-
rameters of OMB's powers under Executive Order 12,291.41 In this
way, while not directly addressing the issue of jurisdiction over
OMB, the court 'implicated' OMB in an order issued to the agency
with responsibility to promulgate a regulation.
c. Discovery
To prove illegal conduct by OMB in its review of agency regula-
tions, a litigant has to acquire evidence showing that OMB has pre-
vented an agency from fulfilling its statutory mandate or has acted in
excess of its authority under E.O. 12,291. OMB's actions, however,
take place in the course of deliberations by and between OMB and
the agency regarding the development of a regulation. OMB docu-
ments and information will necessarily contain advice, recommenda-
tions, and deliberations customarily privileged from disclosure
under the deliberative process privilege and, in some cases, the
qualified executive privilege. 42 The litigant may find it difficult to
convince a court to compel the disclosure of such communications,
absent a showing of illegal conduct. It is a bedrock principle of ad-
ministrative law that, in order to promote the efficient functioning
of government, private parties are not entitled to discover the
thoughts and impressions of government decisionmakers. 43
41. EDF v. Thomas, 627 F. Supp. 566 (D.D.C. 1986).
42. The compelling need for confidentiality in exchanges between executive agen-
cies and OMB has been recognized:
OMB's review of [notices of) proposed regulations [is] undertaken pursuant to Ex-
ecutive Order 12,291 to coordinate burdensome regulations. Such communica-
tions between an agency and the President (and his delegatees) is perfectly legal...
[and is] exempt under the deliberative process privilege.
National Tank Truck Carriers, Inc. v. Office of Management and Budget, No. 82-0093,
slip op. (D.D.C. May 23, 1982), citing Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 406 (D.C. Cir.
1981).
43. United States v. Morgan, 304 U.S. 1 (1937). "Just as ajudge cannot be subjected
to such scrutiny, so the integrity of the administrative process must be equally
respected." United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 408,422 (1941). An agency head's privi-
lege to keep confidential his own and his subordinates' thought processes and delibera-
tions serves a "policy of frank and open discussion" among those upon whom rests the
responsibility of decisionmaking. Carl Zeiss, 40 F.R.D. 318, 324 (D.D.C. 1966), aft'd,
384 F.2d 979 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 952 (1967). The privilege protects
"recommendations, draft documents, proposals, suggestions, and other subjective doc-
uments which reflect the personal opinion of the writer rather than the policy of the
agency," Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Department of Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 866 (D.C.
Cir. 1980), or are "part of a process by which governmental decisions and policies are
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A litigant will encounter even more difficulty with regard to ob-
taining disclosure of communications to and between officials in
OMB undertaken to facilitate the efficient discharge of the Presi-
dent's Article II responsibilities. 44 In such instances, the informa-
tion sought must be shown to be "essential." The court must then
determine after in camera inspection that each piece of information
sought is both relevant and admissible.45 This protection is neces-
sary, because interference by the courts in a preliminary stage of
development of a regulation would improperly entangle the judici-
ary in the executive's attempt to carry out its duty to promulgate
responsible regulations.
Executive Order 12,291 thus provides for a necessary, privileged
exchange of views between OMB and executive agencies. The Or-
der sets forth a procedure for the cooperative consideration of no-
tices of proposed rulemaking issued by executive agencies,
encouraging the agencies to allow themselves to be guided by poli-
cies outlined by the President and overseen by OMB. The Execu-
tive Order is, however, careful not to deprive agencies of the
flexibility, discretion, and independence delegated them by
Congress.
d. Available Remedies
Apart from the discovery problems a litigant would face in pursu-
ing a claim of illegal conduct by OMB, he or she must carefully con-
sider limitations on available remedies. Again, most environmental
statutes only confer jurisdiction on a district court to order the Ad-
formulated." Carl Zeiss, 40 F.R.D. at 324, quoted in NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421
U.S. 132, 150 (1975). Purely factual material may fall within the privilege if it is inextri-
cably intertwined with deliberative material or reveals the agency's deliberative
processes. See, e.g., Mead Data Central Inc. v. Air Force, 566 F.2d 242 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
44. As the Supreme Court held in United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705 (1974),
the public interest in protecting "communications between high Government officials
and those who advise and assist them in the performance of their manifold duties ... is
too plain to require further discussion." Thus, when the governmental communications
are those of the President and his staff, justification for a caliber of protection superior
to the deliberative process privilege available to heads of executive branch agencies
arises from the need to protect the unfettered exercise of the President's powers under
Article II of the Constitution:
Whatever the nature of the privilege of confidentiality of Presidential communica-
tions in the exercise of Art. II powers, the privilege can be said to derive from the
supremacy of each branch within its own assigned area of constitutional duties.
Certain powers and privileges flow from the nature of enumerated powers; the pro-
tection of the confidentiality of Presidential communications has similar constitutional
underpinnings.
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 705-06 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
45. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 713-14.
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ministrator of EPA to perform nondiscretionary duties.46 Such pro-
visions do not give the court any authority to issue an order with
respect to OMB, or to intrude into matters requiring exercise of
EPA's discretion.
Where an environmental statute commits review of the content of
a regulation to the court of appeals, any lawsuit seeking review of
the "content" of agency action, as opposed to the timing of agency
action, is subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the court of ap-
peals.47 A district court would in such instances have no authority
to address the appropriate scope or content of regulations. Nor
would a district court have authority to review the reasonableness of
delayed agency action.
In short, under a statutory scheme which bifurcates jurisdiction,
giving district courts authority to order the Administrator of EPA to
perform nondiscretionary acts and courts of appeals authority to re-
view final agency action, the district court has virtually no power
other than to order EPA to meet the statutory deadline. In these
cases, district courts can neither review the reasonableness of ac-
tions by EPA and OMB nor limit EPA's authority to engage in dis-
cretionary acts such as consultation with OMB. District courts only
have authority to set deadlines; while they are allowed to issue any
additional relief they deem appropriate to ensure that the deadline
is met, in doing so they must not interfere with executive branch
prerogatives.
A federal court also has only limited jurisdiction to interfere with
the executive prerogative to supervise subordinates. Principles of
separation of powers mandate that a federal court not meddle in the
internal affairs of another branch of government.48 In view of sepa-
ration of powers concerns, courts have not hesitated, under the doc-
trine of remedial discretion, to refuse to issue any relief that would
result in intrusion into the prerogatives of a coordinate branch. 49
Because a party cannot have a right of action without a remedy,
courts in these cases have exercised their remedial discretion to dis-
miss such lawsuits. 50
46. See supra, note 41.
47. See Telecommunications Research and Action Center v. FCC, 750 F.2d 70 (D.C.
Cir. 1984).
48. See Moore v. House of Representatives, 733 F.2d 946, 956 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
49. Id.; Crockett v. Reagan, 720 F.2d 1355, 1357 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Vander Jagt v.
O'Neill, 699 F.2d 1166, 1175 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 823 (1983); Riegle v.
Federal Open Market Comm., 656 F.2d 873, 881 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
50. See, e.g., Moore v. House of Representatives, 733 F.2d at 956.
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B. Challenges in Congress
Environmental groups also have helped to initiate legislation in
Congress designed to limit and weaken OMB's role in review of reg-
ulations. 51 Such legislation would greatly impair OMB's ability to
conduct the necessary review of regulations under E.O. 12,291.
In 1984, a bill was introduced into the Senate which would have
subjected the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs to
greater oversight by Congress and the public.5 2 Proponents of the
bill sought to establish the position of Administrator of OIRA as
one requiring Senate confirmation, grant OIRA a four year authori-
zation of appropriations and, most importantly, require the Director
of OMB to make available to the public "any written material per-
taining" to a rule or regulation submitted to OIRA by a rulemaking
agency. The bill also required that written deliberative exchanges
between OMB and a rulemaking agency generated in the regulatory
review process be placed in the public record.53
After this bill failed to pass, another bill was introduced which
would also have disrupted OMB's review of regulations. This bill,
entitled the Rulemaking Information Act of 1986, required the es-
tablishment of a rulemaking file whenever an agency took "any ac-
tion to consider whether to initiate a rulemaking."54 The file was to
include all written material sent by the agency to OMB and a de-
scription of substantive changes made in response to any written or
oral comments from OMB. If an OMB employee based the com-
ments he or she made to the agency on written or oral contacts with
a person outside the government, the bill required that he or she
provide the agency with a written summary for the file. The file
would be made available to the public when the agency published a
notice of proposed rulemaking. Agencies would also have to pub-
lish in the Federal Register a list of all proposed and final rules that
had been submitted to OMB, and a list of the dates on which those
rules were submitted to OMB for review. OMB review would be
limited to thirty days, with a possible extension of no more than
51. Legislative interest in the OMB regulatory review cases has been high. In Public
Citizen Health Research Group v. Rowland, Nos. 84-1252, 84-1392, 85-1014 (D.C. Cir.
argued Jan. 22, 1986), the chairmen of five congressional committees filed an amicus
brief, and in EDF the lead counsel for the Environmental Defense Fund testified on the
case before the Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Relations of the Senate Committee
on Governmental Affairs on the same day Judge Flannery issued his decision. See supra,
note 19.
52. S. 2433, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984).
53. Id. at §§ 3, 4.
54. S. 2033, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986).
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thirty days, and that only for good cause shown. Finally, the bill
required agencies to make draft and final regulations available to
the public within fifteen days of submission to OMB. 55
The provisions of these bills are a sharp departure from tradi-
tional administrative practice within the executive branch, and
would have seriously undermined the President's ability to super-
vise subordinates, as well as the ability of those subordinates to
carry out Administration policies. To fulfill his responsibilities
under Article II of the Constitution, the President must be able to
consult with his subordinates freely and supervise them closely.
The President's power to remove appointees, while certainly a
power which gives him overall control of his subordinates, is not a
power which is frequently or easily invoked. To ensure that subor-
dinates are implementing his policies properly, a President must
have the ability to discuss matters with them, free from any concern
that an exchange of remarks and suggestions will be made part of
the public record. Such discussions should also be conducted with-
out fear of interference from coordinate branches of government. 56
Separation of powers concerns limit not only the federal courts'
authority to issue relief restraining the ability of OMB and other
agencies to consult, but also the authority of Congress. Obviously,
Congress can and does enact laws that limit executive power. How-
ever, Congress impermissibly intrudes upon executive power when
it unreasonably limits the time or the nature of consideration of a
matter by the executive, or requires disclosure of predecisional, de-
liberative executive branch communications. 57 Certainly, Congress
may set deadlines for executive action or require that a regulation
be promulgated by a certain agency. But if Congress limits consul-
tation within the executive, or requires disclosure of privileged ex-
ecutive branch communications, the principle of separation of
powers is violated and the legislation is constitutionally suspect.
55. S. 2033, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., at § 3(a) (1986). Several members of the House
of Representatives have also suggested recently that the OMB office that conducts regu-
latory review not be granted additional funding. HAZARDOUS WASTE REPORT, Apr. 14.
1986, at 9. Congress has made only a few attempts to preclude OMB review. See, e.g.,
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(4)(B)(ii) (1982); H.R.J. Res. 413, 98th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1983), incorporating by reference H.R. 4139, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) (rider
preventing OMB from reviewing agricultural marketing orders under E.O. 12,291
tacked onto OMB appropriation bill).
56. See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705 (1974); Sierra Club v. Costle,
657 F.2d 298, 405 (1980). On disclosure of information and ex parte contacts by OMB
officials, see generally DeMuth & Ginsburg, supra note 1, at 1086-87.
57. See NRDC v. Train, 510 F.2d 692 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
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While Congress may compel an agency of the executive to issue a
regulation, it may not prevent other offices of the executive from
conferring with that agency or influencing its decisionmaking. As
noted by Judge Wald in Sierra Club v. Costle:
The authority of the President to control and supervise executive poli-
cymaking is derived from the Constitution; the desirability of such
control is demonstrable from the practical realities of administrative
rulemaking. Regulations such as those involved here demand a care-
ful weighing of cost, environmental, and energy considerations. They
also have broad implications for national economic policy. Our form
of government simply could not function effectively or rationally if key
executive policymakers were isolated from each other and from the
Chief Executive. Single mission agencies do not always have the an-
swers to complex regulatory problems. An overworked administrator
exposed on a 24-hour basis to a dedicated but zealous staff needs to
know the arguments and ideas of policymakers in other agencies as
well as in the White House. 58
Moreover, as the Supreme Court made clear in Vermont Yankee Nu-
clear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 59 an executive branch agency is in a better
position than Congress or the courts to develop a regulation ad-
justed to meet the peculiarities of a particular industry:
[T]his Court has for more than four decades emphasized that the for-
mulation of procedures was basically left within the discretion of agen-
cies to which Congress had confided the responsibility for substantive
judgments. In FCC v. Schreiber, 381 U.S. 279, 290 (1965), the Court
explicated this principle, describing it as "an outgrowth of the con-
gressional determination that administrative agencies and administra-
tors will be familiar with the industries which they regulate and will be
in a better position than the federal courts or Congress itself to design
procedural rules adapted to the peculiarities of the industry and the
tasks of the agency involved. 60
In short, the courts have recognized that the executive branch has
broad latitude to determine in what order and using what proce-
dures it will tackle a complex subject matter.61 Congress should not
limit the internal decisionmaking of the executive branch by pre-
cluding executive agencies and offices from conferring. Nor should
Congress circumscribe executive discretion through imposing time
limits for regulatory review. Certainly, Congress can set deadlines
for issuance of regulations, but these deadlines are not and cannot
58. Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d at 406 (footnote omitted).
59. 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
60. Id. at 524-25.
61. See FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 145 (1940).
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be fixed in stone. Beginning with NRDC v. Train,62 federal courts
have allowed to the executive branch the discretion to extend dead-
lines set by Congress as long as the executive has been proceeding
in good faith. 63 After a deadline is missed, the executive can take all
reasonable measures to ensure that the regulation which is later is-
sued will not be overturned as arbitrary and capricious.
Attempts by Congress to mandate that OMB review occur only
within a maximum of sixty days of the issuance of regulations also
constitute an unconstitutional interference with the President's au-
thority to control and direct the executive branch. While it is diffi-
cult to state with precision the circumstances under which the time
limit would impermissibly intrude upon executive prerogatives, one
can easily imagine a sixty day period being insufficient to allow for
proper review and discussion of a rule. Recognizing that deadlines
may be impossible to meet, the courts have readily granted long ex-
tensions for the completion of regulations. As noted in NRDC v.
Train, the courts
... cannot responsibly mandate flat guidelines when the Administra-
tor demonstrates that additional time is necessary to insure that the
guidelines are rooted in an understanding of the relative merits of
available control technologies. The delay required to give meaningful
consideration to the technical intricacies of promising control mecha-
nisms may well speed achievement of the goal of pollution abatement
by obviating the need for time-consuming corrective measures at a
later date.64
Given the courts' willingness to give executive agencies the time
they need to develop a regulation, it would be strange indeed if
OIRA, the office designated by the President to supervise develop-
ment of regulations, should not be permitted any reasonable time
extension past the sixty day limit set in the proposed legislation.
Nor is there any need for such legislation. Congress can conduct
oversight hearings if it believes an agency is failing to execute the
law properly,65 and it can request specific, unprivileged documents
62. 510 F.2d 692, 712-14 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
63. Id.; Illinois v. Costle, 12 ERC 1597 (D.D.C. 1979).
64. NRDC v. Train, 510 F.2d at 712 (footnote omitted).
65. Professor Bruff has noted some problems with the congressional oversight pro-
cess. Bruff, supra note 1, at 456-59. These include the complex and unwieldy committee
structure, which hampers congressional efforts to coordinate policy; the fact that com-
mittees are not representative in the way that the Congress as a whole, or each House, is;
that a committee may be dominated by a single powerful chairman or member, or by
members sympathetic to the agency or its regulated industry. Bruff also points out the
sporadic nature of oversight hearings in the past, and suggests that instead of oversight
hearings, Congress may wish to use appropriations, or the Senate power of advice and
consent on presidential appointments, to oversee executive review of the rulemaking
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from the agency or OMB if it suspects that a problem has arisen.
Factual information on which rulemakers rely is, of course, subject
to requests for disclosure. And existing law already provides mech-
anisms by which the public can review agency decisionmaking in
connection with rulemaking. The agency's decision must be suffi-
ciently supported by the public record, or it will likely be overturned
by a court as arbitrary and capricious under the APA. As far as privi-
leged communications are concerned, the executive branch has
shared such communications with Congress where it believes that
doing so will not compromise the need to protect the candid and
frank discussion of policy.66 Moreover, it appears that OMB will
change its internal procedures to make public all original versions of
draft and final rules sent by agencies to OMB, along with OMB's
suggested changes and the reasons for them.67 Lists of phone calls
and meetings, as well as written material received from industry and
other parties, may also be disclosed under the revised procedures. 68
In view of these disclosures, as well as information already on the
public record upon which an agency must base its decision, there is
no justification for further publicizing preliminary, intra-executive
branch policy discussions, particularly when such disclosure could
harm the quality of government regulation.
III. Conclusion
Although the executive branch must be permitted to exercise its
prerogatives for the system of separation of powers to work effec-
tively, the courts and Congress must also have authority to check
potential abuses by the executive branch in the exercise of its au-
thority. While there are a number of limitations that prevent the
courts and Congress from interfering with executive prerogatives,
they nonetheless have sufficient authority to oversee executive ac-
tions in the regulatory review process.
It is also clear that federal courts have the power to restrain OMB
from forcing an agency to adopt a position which is not supported
by the administrative record, and to prevent OMB from reviewing a
process. On the other hand, however, executive branch agencies frequently make avail-
able to such oversight committees documents that are customarily privileged from dis-
closure in judicial proceedings.
66. For example, in EDF v. Thomas, Congressman Dingell asked EPA for docu-
ments that had been requested by EDF. EPA supplied the Congressman with these doc-
uments even though they were exempt from disclosure under the deliberative process
privilege, simply requesting that he keep them confidential.
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regulation after a statutory deadline has passed without the consent
of the head of the agency responsible for that rulemaking. After a
regulation has been issued, a federal court has jurisdiction to review
whether the agency decision is consistent with the administrative
record; if the decision is inconsistent with this record, it is arbitrary
and may be overturned.
Congress also has the ability to oversee and control OMB review
of agency regulations. Congress has set up oversight committees to
review the conduct of agencies created through congressional dele-
gation of powers, as well as the conduct of OMB. When controver-
sies arise, Congress has not hesitated to hold oversight hearings.
Congress can always attempt to limit OMB involvement in regula-
tory review. Congress may set regulatory deadlines that preclude
extensive OMB review, or may even prohibit in an agency's enabling
statute the use of cost-benefit analysis in that agency's decisionmak-
ing process. However, Congress would be ill-advised to so limit the
internal decisionmaking processes of the executive branch. While
Congress may set some criteria for executive decisionmaking, Con-
gress should not preclude consultation within the executive branch
or set time deadlines for enactment which may prevent promulga-
tion of responsible regulations. Maintaining the integrity of execu-
tive branch decisionmaking, including OMB review under Executive
Order 12,291, is imperative if the executive branch is to remain
strong and carry out its intended role under our system of separa-
tion of powers.
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